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BISHOP V. ARONOV: RELIGION-TAINTED
VIEWPOINTS ARE BANNED FROM THE
MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS*
Recent developments in the academic community have evidenced in-
creasing tension between university professors' and students' First Amend-
ment rights on one hand and a university's right to establish and regulate
its curriculum and protect its standards and reputation on the other.' Many
schools have responded to this tension by formulating speech codes and
censoring individuals for vulgar, offensive or otherwise inappropriate or,
more cynically, politically incorrect speech. 2 Such actions by a university
necessarily encroach on students' and professors' First Amendment rights
and run counter to the Supreme Court's notion that a university should be
an open "marketplace of ideas. ' 3 The Supreme Court only partially has
* The Supreme Court denied certiorari to Professor Bishop's appeal just after the
Washington & Lee Law Review submitted this note for publication. Bishop v. Delchamps, 112
S. Ct. 3026 (1992). The failure of the Supreme Court to address these issues does not effect
the relevancy of the cases or analysis presented in this note.
1. See David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional"
Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, LAw & CoNrTamp. PROBS., vol. 53, Summer
1990, at 227 (noting that friction exists between professors' academic freedom and schools'
institutional freedom and suggesting balancing approach). Professor Rabban argues that when
a professor engages in speech in a public forum or in speech that is within the ambit of the
professor's area of personal expertise, the professor's right to academic freedom should prevail
over institutional freedom. Id. at 300. Conversely, institutional freedom should prevail when
courts review institutional decisions regarding selection of teachers, students, curriculum and
teaching strategy. Id.; see also, Gregory A. Clarick, Note, Public School Teachers and The
First Amendment: Protecting the Right to Teach, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693 (1990) (arguing that
professors' academic freedom to express their own ideas in classroom is essential to prevent
school boards from indoctrinating students with government favored viewpoints). Clarick
criticizes the Supreme Court for its decision in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260 (1988), which lowered the level of review applied to school board restrictions on
professor and student speech to a de facto rational basis test. Id. at 734. Clarick argues that
such restrictions constitute viewpoint discrimination and that viewpoint disciimination has no
rational basis in schools that are training students to be critical thinkers. Id.
2. See, e.g., Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich 1989) (holding
unconstitutional school speech policy which censured speech that stigmatized or victimized
individuals on basis of race, ethnicity or religion); Chester E. Finn, Jr., The Campus; "An
Island of Repression in a Sea of Freedom, ", COMMENTARY, Sept. 1989, at 17 (noting that
number of universities have adopted codes that censor blatantly offensive speech); David
Rosenberg, Note, Racist Speech, The First Amendment, and Public Universities: Taking a
Stand on Neutrality, 76 CoRNmE L. Rav. 549, 587-88 (1991) (same).
3. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)
(holding that school could not prohibit its students from wearing black armbands in protest
of Vietnam War); see also Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 587-88 (arguing that courts ought to
strike down university speech codes because such codes are inherently vague and tend to chill
open speech). Rosenberg notes that a university subverts its own constitutional purpose as a
marketplace of ideas when it employs a speech code that censors offensive political speech.
Id.
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defined the notion of freedom of speech on campus, or "academic free-
dom," as a constitutional right.4 While decisions dealing with academic
freedom at the university level have addressed free speech occurring outside
the classroom, these discussions have left open the issue of classroom
speech.' A number of the Court's decisions involving academic freedom at
the primary and secondary, school level, on the other hand, have defined
the ambit of academic freedom within the classroom., These cases, however,
are not dispositive at the university level. Because college students are more
mature than their primary and secondary school counterparts, the Supreme
Court has held consistently that more freedom of expression is appropriate
at the university level than at the secondary or primary school level.7 The
issue becomes even more complicated in cases like Bishop v.Aronov8 in
which the professors' and students' speech at a public university involves
religious doctrines because Establishment Clause and freedom of religion
doctrines come into play.9 The Bishop case attempts to explore the legal
void at the university level.
CASE BACKGROUND
Phillip A. Bishop is a professor of exercise physiology at the University
of Alabama.' 0 During the fall of 1984, Professor Bishop commented to his
class that he was a Christian and that, because his religious beliefs colored
every aspect of his life, his students should recognize and filter this Christian
bias ' " In response to student questions regarding academic pressures, Pro-
4. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (arguing that Supreme Court had
historically used term academic freedom for rhetorical effect rather than as statement of
substantive constitutional rights).
5. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (holding that Board of
Regents cannot censor its teachers' extra-curricular speech concerning communism without
proving teacher's specific intent to engage in unlawful action).
6. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (holding that high school administrators may not censor
students' classroom speech unless the speech causes substantial and material disruption of
school's educational operations); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72
(1988) (holding that high school administrators may regulate student or teacher speech that
occurs during all programs that school affirmatively promotes, such as curriculum, provided
that such action is reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns).
7. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 & n.14 (1981) (stating that college students
were sufficiently astute to recognize that views of particular campus organizations were not
reflective of university policies and that allowing these clubs to meet in school buildings did
not confer imprimatur of university approval on clubs.
8. Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991).
9. See infra notes 162-227 and accompanying text (arguing that Professor Bishop's
classroom comments do not impact on Establishment Clause concerns or, assuming that the
comments do impact on Establishment Clause concerns, University of Alabama's speech
regulation is more a violation of Establishment Clause than comments it regulates).
10. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1068.
11. Id. at 1068 (citing Affidavit of Phillip A. Bishop in District Court opinion). Although
no transcript of Professor Bishop's classroom comments exists, the Affidavit contains the
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fessor Bishop stated that his religious beliefs helped him to surmount the
academic stresses in his life.' 2 Professor Bishop occasionally would mention
"God" as an ontological explanation for the incredible complexity of human
physiology. 3 In addition, Professor Bishop held an optional class, open to
all students, entitled "Evidences of God in Human Physiology."1 4 Professor
Bishop employed a blind grading system for all of his.courses and did not
require any of his students to attend the optional class.
15
The University alleged that a number of students had objected to
Professor Bishop's classroom comments and to the optional class, com-
plainingthat they felt coerced by his proselytizing, especially because Pro-
fessor Bishop held the optional class just prior to final examinations.' 6 In
response to the students' grievances and because the University administra-
tion found Professor Bishop's remarks to be inappropriate, the' school
forbade Professor Bishop from making further religious remarks in the
classroom and from holding similar optional classes. 17 The University cited
following approximation of Professor Bishop's classroom comments:
After giving it considerable thought, I have decided for myself when I die, I would
like to leave something behind something more important and valuable than a stack
of technical papers. I think that people are important and eternal, paper is neither.
I want to invest my time mainly in people. I personally believe that God came to
earth in the form of Jesus Christ and [H]e has something to tell us about life which
is 'crucial to success and happiness. Now this is simply my personal belief, understand,
and I try to model my life after Christ, who was concerned with people, and I feel
that this is the wisest thing I can do. You need to recognize as my students that
this is my bias and it colors everything I say and do. If that is not your bias, that
is fine. You need, however to, filter everything I say with that (Christian bias) filter.
If you observe something in my life that is inconsistent with Christianity, please let
me know, because, I believe that it is much more important than a pile of papers.
Id.
12. Id.
13. lieposition of Phillip A. Bishop, taken 3-14-89, p..81, line 21 - p. 20, line 11. As
an example of this other type of allegedly religious comment, Professor Bishop would describe
the production and destruction of red blood cells and how they adapt to temperature. He
noted that if this system is out of balance by even the most minuscule amount, the body
would cease to function within minutes. Professor Bishop then commented how "God designed
this intricate system." Id. at p. 18, lines 14-21; p.30, line 18 - p.31, line 12. In using the term
"God," Professor Bishop claimed that he was referring to a creative and purposeful force
rather than specifically to the Judeo-Christian God. Id.
14. Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d at 1068-69.
15. Id. at 1069..
16. Id. In actuality, Professor Bishop's supervisor, Professor Westerfield, could not
remember the names of any of the students who made complaints. Deposition of Carl
Westerfield, taken 1-5-89, p.21, lines 5-21. Neither did Professor Westerfield recall how many
students had complained, but he did remember that at least three students complained over a
four year span. Id. These students seemingly complained in response to Professor Bishop's
optional class. Cf. Id. at p.16, line 7 - p.17, line 10 (this assumption is based on record that
stipulates that even though Professor Bishop had been teaching and making religious comments
for four years, none of complaints surfaced until soon after Professor Bishop presented his
optional class).
17. Id. at 1069-70.
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also a concern with transgression of the Establishment Clause as justification
for the restriction on Professor Bishop's speech." Professor Bishop appealed
the school's actions to the University of Alabama's president arid, upon
losing his case there, filed suit in federal district court.' 9
The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Alabama found
for Professor Bishop, holding that the University of Alabama could not
restrict Professor Bishop's classroom comments.20 The district court prohib-
ited also the University of Alabama from enjoining Professor Bishop's
optional classes provided that the classes were clearly independent of his
students' grades. 2' The district court, employing a strict scrutiny standard,
held that a university may not enjoin disfavored religious speech unless the
exclusion is necessary to further a compelling governmental interest." The
district court noted that because the University of Alabama opened its
classroom and facilities to other divergent ideas and theories, it could not
discriminate against religious ideas and theories.
23
The district court also held that Professor Bishop's comments and
optional class did not constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause.2
The district court noted that, at the university level, a professor's or student's
speech is a free expression of that particular individual's ideas and does
not, therefore, reflect on the university. 2 As authority for this proposition,
the district court cited prior cases in which the Supreme Court had held
that a professor's or student's out-of-class statements did not reflect on a
university's reputation or policies. 26 The district court noted further that the
18. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1069. The memo from the administration to Professor Bishop
read as follows:
Foremost, I want to reaffirm our commitment to your right of academic freedom
and freedom of religious belief. This communication should not be construed as an
attempt to interfere with or suppress your freedoms. From discourse with you and
others, I feel that certain actions on your behalf are unwarranted at a public
institution such as the University of Alabama and should cease. Among those actions
that should be discontinued are: 1) the interjection of religious beliefs and/or
preferences during instructional time periods and 2) the optional classes where a
"Christian Perspective" of an academic topic is delivered. I must also remind you
that religious beliefs and/or the strength of a belief can not be utilized in the
decisions concerning the recruitment, admission or retention [of students].
Id.
19. Id. at 1069-70.
20. Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562, 1568 (N.D. Ala. 1990), rev'd, 926 F.2d 1066
(11th Cir. 1991).
21. Id. at 1566-67.
22. Id. at 1566.
23. Id. at 1565-66.
24. Id. at 1566-67.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1565 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981)) (stating that
students have sufficient maturity to ascertain that views of professors and campus organizations
do not necessarily reflect views of university); see also Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
563 (1968) (holding that school cannot censor teacher for disagreeing with school policy in
local newspaper); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (holding that Board of
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University of Alabama held classes that discussed Christian theology and
that the University did not consider these classes to implicate the Establish-
ment Clause.27
Finally, the district court found that the University of Alabama's speech
restriction was vague and overbroad.2 The district court stated that the
University's order to excise "all religious comments" was too vague because
it did not delineate adequately between proscribed speech and appropriate
speech? 9 Additionally, the district court felt that the restriction was over-
broad because the restriction prohibited Professor Bishop from discussing
essential course topics such as the history of the development of physiology
in medieval universities. 0
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
decision regarding Professor Bishop's classroom comments, holding that the
University of Alabama could regulate its professors' and students' classroom
speech during instructional periods provided that the restrictions are rea-
sonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 3' The appellate court
based its decision on a line of cases dealing with primary and secondary
school education in which the courts relied on a policy that dictates that
the school administration has a duty to inculcate certain values to its
students, and may, therefore, enjoin any speech it deems inconsistent with
those values.32 Based on the secondary school cases, the appellate court held
Regents may not censure professor for extracurricular activities involving communist party
unless it can show that professor is engaging in unlawful activity).
27. Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562, 1567 (N.D. Ala. 1990) rev'd 926 F.2d 1066
(11th Cir. 1991).
28. Id. at 1566.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074 (1991) (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) for proposition that school may restrict speech in forums that
it affirmatively promotes provided that restrictions are reasonably related to legitimate peda-
gogical concerns).
32. See id. at 1074, 1075 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988)
for proposition that educators may regulate student's and professor's speech provided that
their reasons for restrictions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns); Virgil
v. School Bd., 862 F.2d 1517, 1523-25 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that school board does not
violate constitutional rights of students when it removes vulgar textbooks from curriculum
because school board's action is reasonably related to its legitimate concern of matching
curriculum with maturity of students). But see Alabama Student Party v. Student Gov't Ass'n.
867 F.2d 1344, 1345 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that Student Government Association of
University of Alabama did not violate First Amendment rights of candidates for student
government offices by placing time, place and manner restrictions on campaigning because
regulations were reasonably related to university's legitimate interest in minimizing disruptive
effect of campaigning). Although Alabama Student Party did address speech at the university
level, that case merely involved time, place and manner restrictions upon an otherwise public
forum. Id. Kuhlmeier and Virgil, on the other hand, held that the school facilities were
nonpublic forums. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 267; Virgil, 862 F.2d at 1523-25; see infra notes
87-148 and accompanying text (discussing and applying forum analysis).
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that the university classroom is not a public forum.3 3 The appellate court
then engaged in a balancing approach, weighing Professor Bishop's First
Amendment rights against the University of Alabama's right to control the
use of its property. 4 The appellate court also noted that the University of
Alabama's position as a public employer might allow it to restrain its
employees' First Amendment rights to a greater extent than it could restrict
the rights of other persons, such as students, who use the University of
Alabama's facilities.3" Instead of a strict scrutiny standard of review, the
appellate court used a rational basis standard of review. 36 The appellate
court was concerned that application of a strict scrutiny standard in ana-
lyzing school regulations affecting speech would tempt courts to supplant
their own opinion in place of the school administration on the issue of
which subjects have academic merit.
3 7
Although the appellate court expressly declined to address the Estab-
lishment Clause issue, the court cautioned that Professor Bishop's optional
class represented a possible infraction.38 The appellate court indicated that
the topic of Professor Bishop's optional class was very similar to the study
of scientific creationism.3 9 The Supreme Court prohibited the teaching of
scientific creationism in public high school biology classes in Edwards v.
Aguillard4° because the Establishment Clause proscribed the use of govern-
ment resources, such as a public high school class, to advance religious
views.
41
33. See Bishop at 1071 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist v. Kuhlmeier, 484, U.S. 260, 267
(1988) for proposition that if educators reserve classroom facilities for other intended purposes,
such as instructional periods, then they have not created a public forum).
34. Id. at 1074-77 (adopting balance between University's interest in regulating speech
of its professors in classrooms and Professor Bishop's interest in free speech).
35. See id. at 1074 (stating that State's interest in regulating speech of its employees is
substantially different than its interest in regulating the speech of general public).
36. Id.
37. See id. at 1075 (stating that courts should not supplant university discretion in
promulgating schools' curriculum thereby becoming "ersatz deans or educators").
38. Id. at 1077.
39. See id. (noting that creation or design facet of Professor Bishop's optional class was
very similar to teaching of Creation Science curriculum that Court found to violate Establish-
ment Clause in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)). The Edwards Court struck down
a statute that mandated the teaching of Creation Science anytime teachers instructed students
on evolutionary science. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987). The Edwards
Court was concerned that because the government mandated the teaching of Creation Science,
the action was a violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. The Edwards Court did not
address, however, whether a public school teacher, who might discuss Creation Science of his
or her own volition, would violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 587.
40. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
41. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 596-97 (1987). Edwards addressed the constitu-
tionality of the Louisiana Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act,
LA. Rav. STAT. ANN., §§ 17:286.1-286.7 (West 1992), which mandated that Louisiana public
schools teach creation science whenever evolution science is included in the curriculum.
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 580-81. Utilizing the Lemon test, the Court declared the statute




The controversy in Bishop arose from the fact that the Supreme Court
has yet to reconcile clearly the two major aspects of academic freedom.
42
The Court and scholars traditionally have defined academic freedom along
the lines of two seemingly complimentary premises-individual or aca-
demic freedom and institutional freedom. 43 The first premise, individual
or academic freedom, posits that the government should not impinge on
a teacher's right to advance unpopular or unconventional ideas because
the university ideally should be a marketplace of ideas where students
can encounter and examine diverse points of view."4
The second premise, institutional freedom, protects the university's
right to freedom from government oversight. 45 This premise posits that a
university should be free from government regulation in establishing its
curriculum lest the curriculum otherwise become a vehicle for indoctri-
nating the masses with government-favored views. 46 Under this premise,
courts and scholars originally viewed institutional and academic freedom
as consistent because a university's institutional freedom provided teachers
and students an extra layer of protection from government interference
with their academic freedom. 47 The incompatibility of academic freedom
and institutional freedom became apparent when students and professors
began to express opinions that were unpalatable to school administrators,
08 and accompanying text (discussing Lemon test). Edwards held that the statute violated the
first prong of the Lemon test because the legislature had enacted it with a non-secular intent.
Id. at 589. The Court held that the statute also violated the second prong of the Lemon test
because it had the primary effect of advancing religion. Id. at 594.
42. See infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text (arguing that Supreme Court traditionally
has defined academic freedom in terms of two seemingly complimentary policies-students'
and professors' free speech rights and universities' rights to establish curriculum-and that
Bishop represents conflict of these policies).
43. See Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic
Freedom in America, 66 TEx. L. Rav. 1265, 1266-67 (1988) (arguing that two definitions of
academic freedom have developed that appear to be compatible but are often in conflict).
Hereinafter, I will use the term 'academic freedom' to refer to the rights of students and
teachers under the First Amendment and 'institutional freedom' to refer to universities' freedom
from government interference.
44. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (Warren, C.J., plurality
opinion) (noting that university lecturer has right under First Amendment to academic freedom);
See Rabban, supra note 1, at 236 (stating that Sweezy first constitutionalized professor's right
to academic freedom).
45. See Rabban, supra note 1, at 239 (arguing that institutional freedom protected
institutional autonomy from whims of democratic society). Academic freedom has become
increasingly important as university administrations increasingly have become involved in
political matters. See supra note 2, and accompanying text (noting increase in university speech
codes).
46. Rabban, supra note 1, at 255.
47. See id. at 237 (stating that, prior to Civil War, academic and institutional freedom
were in harmony because academic freedom barely existed and because courts and scholars
viewed academic freedom, to extent it existed, to be related to institutional freedom from
governmental interference).
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such as opposition to the Vietnam War,48 public disagreement with school
policy, 49 and advocacy of communism. 0
When the Supreme Court initially employed the term "academic free-
dom," the Court used the term as a platitude and left it generally unde-
fined."' The Court usually resolved these cases on some other constitutional
basis, such as due process, the privilege against self-incrimination, or basic
First Amendment freedoms.52 Academic freedom first attained a level of
special constitutional protection in 1957 in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.3 In
Sweezy the Supreme Court struck down a New Hampshire statute that
censored a university professor for lecturing in support of communism.54 In
analyzing the professor's First Amendment right, Chief Justice Warren's
plurality opinion dedicated a paragraph to the concept of academic freedom:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American univer-
sities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital
role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train
our youth. To impose any strait [sic] jacket upon the intellectual
leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of
48. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)
(holding that school may not enjoin students from wearing black armbands to protest Vietnam
War in classroom unless such activity materially disrupts classroom).
49. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1968) (holding that Board
of Education violated teacher's First Amendment rights when it dismissed teacher because of
his public criticism of school policies).
50. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 391 U.S. 589 (1967) (holding that Board of Regents
could not censor professors for their support of communism).
51. See Rabban, supra note 1, at 235-36 (arguing that Supreme Court had historically
used term academic freedom for rhetorical effect rather than any statement of substantive
Constitutional rights).
52. Id.
53. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
54. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 254-55 (1957) (Warren, C.J., plurality
opinion). In Sweezy, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a New Hampshire statute
that empowered the State Attorney General to investigate all subversive activities. Id. at 236-
39. The Attorney General investigated Sweezy, a professor at the University of New Hampshire,
because of his relations with the Progressive Party. Id. at 238-42. During that investigation,
Professor Sweezy refused to answer questions about his associates' political affiliations, but
the Attorney General did not pursue the matter any further. Id. at 241-42. The Attorney
General reopened his investigation of Professor Sweezy after his office learned that Professor
Sweezy had lectured his class on communism. Id. at 243. Professor Sweezy again refused to
answer certain questions pertaining to his' associates, but this time the Attorney General
instituted contempt proceedings against Professor Sweezy. Id. at 244. Professor Sweezy refused
to answer questions concerning his associates' political affiliations before the Superior Court
of Merrimack County and the court had Professor him incarcerated for contempt. Id. at 244-
45. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed the contempt verdict and the United
States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 254-55. The Court read the New Hampshire statute
narrowly and concluded that the Attorney General had exceeded his statutory authority. Id.
The Court held that the Attorney General's questioning violated Professor Sweezy's Due
Process rights. Id. The Court expressly did not reach the issue of whether New Hampshire
constitutionally could confer the powers of a one-man tribunal on the Attorney General. Id.
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our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended
by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is
that true of the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are
accepted as a absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmos-
phere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new
maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate
and die.
5
Chief Justice Warren's -definition makes clear that universities' freedom
from government control is of special constitutional importance5 6 The
definition does not, however, shed light on the rights of professors and
students vis-a-vis the university itself.
5 7
The Supreme Court first addressed the relationship between a teacher's
academic freedom and a university's right to institutional freedom in Key-
ishian v. Board of Regents.8 Keyishian was a professor at the University
of New York who brought suit against the university for dismissing him
for his refusal to sign a loyalty oath stating that he never had been involved
with the Communist Party. 9 In addressing the constitutionality of the Board
of Regent's policy, Keyishian acknowledged the importance of academic
freedom which the Supreme Court set forth in Sweezy. 60 Because the wording
of the university policy was overly vague, the Court felt that the policy
conferred too much discretion on university officials and would chill free
speech.6' The University policy, therefore, discouraged freedom of expression
that administrators and professors should cultivate to encourage and foster
academic growth.
62
Although the Keyishian Court acknowledged only vaguely that academic
freedom protects a teacher's activities outside the classroom, the Court
elaborated later on this protection in Pickering v. Board of Education.
63
55. Id. at 250.
56. Id.; see also id. at 261 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that government
interference and control of America's universities would imperil universities' function of
enhancing knowledge of various academic disciplines).
57. See Rabban, supra note 1, at 239 (noting that Sweezy Court's description of academic
freedom does not address differences between academic freedom and institutional freedom
from government control).
58. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
59. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 590 (1967).
60. Id. at 603.
61. See id. at 601 (stating that Board of Regent's policy was complicated and vague,
thereby making it "highly efficient in terrorem mechanism"). The Keyishian Court further
noted that the Board of Regent's policy would stifle free speech because only the most
courageous professors would risk their living and entire career by testing the limits of this
vaguely defined policy. Id.
62. See id. (stating that Board of Regent's policy smothers academic freedom and thereby
prevents university from fulfilling role as marketplace of ideas).
63. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In Pickering, the Board of Education fired Pickering, a public
school teacher, for writing a letter to the local paper that criticized the Board's allocation of
15651992]
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Pickering held that a school may restrict a teacher's speech regarding public
concerns only in situations in which the speech would impair the school's
ability to operate efficiently or would significantly diminish the teacher's
ability to function in her capacity as an employee. 6" Because the school can
enjoin speech only in the most dire circumstances, when the speech threatens
the school's or teacher's essential function, this rule appears reminiscent of
the "compelling interest" test utilized by the courts when applying a strict
scrutiny analysis in substantive due process cases.
61
Because the Pickering Court's definition of academic freedom essentially
echoed traditional First Amendment protections, academic freedom, which
Chief Justice Warren had characterized as a special concern of the First
Amendment, did not appear to afford any additional protection to profes-
sors and students than did the First Amendment generally. 66 In fact, the
Pickering Court's concept of academic freedom apparently provided less
protection than the First Amendment.67 The First Amendment uncondition-
ally protects a private employee's speech from employer restriction both
outside and inside the workplace, while Pickering and Keyishian addressed
speech occurring only outside the workplace. 6" If.this is the case, then the
question arises as to what use is the concept of academic freedom? 69
The Supreme Court answered this question in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District,70 stating that "[n]either students
[n]or teachers shed their constitutional -rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate."'7' Tinker held that a school could not
enjoin students from wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam War unless
such activity was disruptive or impinged on the rights of others.7 2 In so
school funds and the Board's nondisclosure of its allocation choices. Id. at 566. The Court
held that the Board violated Pickering's First Amendment rights. Id. at 574-75. The Court
acknowledged that the school has some interest in a teacher's extracurricular speech, but held
that a school may not censure extracurricular speech unless such comments interfere with a
teacher's pedagogical duties or the comments are knowingly or recklessly false. Id.
64. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968) (holding that school's
interest in regulating speech of its teachers is no greater than its right to regulate speech of
public generally except in circumstances where teacher's speech materially impedes classroom
performance or disrupts operation of school).
65. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981) (utilizing compelling interest test
once Court determined that plaintiff's First Amendment rights were at stake).
66. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (noting that Pickering Court used
compelling interest test for violations of academic freedom, which is same test courts use for
First Amendment cases generally).
67. See Clarick, supra note 1, at 701 (noting that Pickering only addresses teachers'
public, not classroom, speech).
68. See id. (noting that First Amendment protected all speech, but academic freedom
only protects teachers' speech that occurs outside workplace).
69. Cf. id. at 702 (stating that Pickering does not address protection of teacher's in-
class speech).
70. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
71. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
72. Id. at 513.
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holding, the Court extended the reach of academic freedom to protect
speech both outside and inside the classroom.73 The Court stressed that, in
order for democracy to flourish, the public school system, which trains the
nation's youth, should aspire to be a "marketplace of ideas." 74 To this
end, the Court required schools to provide a compelling reason for any
injunction against the free speech of their students or professors75.
In the years following Tinker, the federal district courts enlarged the
principle of academic freedom. 76 In Cooper v. Ross, 77 the Federal District.
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas held that a university could not
terminate a professor for teaching a history class from a Marxist perspec-
tive. 78 A year later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held in Kingsville Independent School District v. Cooper" that a school
could not discharge a high school teacher for the teacher's use of an
unorthodox teaching technique. 0 The Fifth Circuit held that the teaching
technique itself was a form a free expression and, therefore, the First
Amendment protects the teacher's choice of pedagogical technique.
81
The Supreme Court reversed this expansion of the right of academic
freedom in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 2 The Kuhlmeier Court
held that school administrators may promulgate reasonable speech restric-
tions in forums that the school affirmatively promotes.83 Kuhlmeier noted
73. See id. at 506 (holding that First Amendment protects classroom speech of students);
see also Clarick, supra note 1, at 705-708 (noting that courts have interpreted Tinker as
extending full First Amendment protection to teachers' and students' classroom speech).
74. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972); see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512
(quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
75. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (holding that school cannot censor students' speech
unless speech substantially disrupts operation of school).
76. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (discussing cases that expanded concept
of academic freedom).
77. 472 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
78. Cooper v. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802, 813-14 (E.D. Ark. 1979). Cooper arose because
the University of Arkansas at Little Rock declined to reappoint Cooper as an assistant professor.
Id. at 806-08. The district court noted that the fact that Cooper recently had joined the
Progressive Labor Party and had taught his history class from a Marxist perspective substan-
tially motivated the University's action. Id. at 808. The district court stated that Cooper had
a First Amendment right to decide the manner in which his class would be taught. Id. at 813-
15. The district court, therefore, held that the University's action directly impinged on Cooper's
academic freedom, thereby violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
79. 611 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1980).
80. Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th Cir. 1980). The
Kingsville case arose when the Kingsville Independent School District refused to renew Cooper's
contract as a teacher of American History due to Cooper's use of an unorthodox pedagogical
method. Id. at 1111. The appellate court stated that the First Amendment protected Cooper's
teaching technique because it was expressive activity. Id. at 1112-13. The Fifth Circuit held
that the school district had violated Cooper's First Amendment rights in the absence of a
showing that the teaching technique destroyed Cooper's effectiveness as an instructor. Id.
81. Id.
82. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
83. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). The dispute in
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that one example of a forum that the school affirmatively promotes is the
curriculum in its classrooms 4 Kuhlmeier distinguished Tinker on the basis
that Tinker only involved independent student speech that the school did
not affirmatively promote. 5 Although it is clear that academic freedom
provides some protection to Professor Bishop's classroom comments, it is
unclear after Kuhimeier exactly how far the Supreme Court will go to
protect these rights.
6
THE CLASSROOM As A PUBLIC FORUM
When addressing the constitutionality of government regulation of speech
that occurs on government-owned property, the courts first will determine
whether the property on which the speech occurs is a public or nonpublic
forum. 7 This classification affects dramatically the First Amendment rights
associated with the use of that forum.8 In a public forum the courts will
subject any restriction to strict scrutiny, with the result that the government
Kuhlmeier arose because a high school teacher overseeing a journalism class exercised his
editorial power to excise two student-written articles from the school newspaper. Id. at 262-
65. The two articles dealt with teen pregnancies and the effect of divorce on children, subjects
that the teacher deemed inappropriate for many high school students. Id. at 263-64. Kuhlmeier
held that the school newspaper was not a public forum because the school administrators had
reserved the newspaper for other intended purposes, namely providing a curriculum for the
journalism class. Id. at 267-70. Because the newspaper had published the views of different
students, Plaintiff argued that the school had created a public forum. See id. at 265 (citing
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d 1368, 1372-74 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 484 U.S.
260 (1988) which held that school had turned newspaper into public forum because newspaper
was conduit for student speech). Because the school administration did not intend to open the
newspaper for indiscriminate use by the general public, Kuhlmeier held that the newspaper
remained a nonpublic forum. Id. at 267-70. Kuhlmeier concluded that school administrators
can regulate student speech in a non-public forum provided that their restrictions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. Id. at 271. Kuhlmeier held that the teacher acted
reasonably in excising the objectionable articles to prevent student exposure to ideas that were
inappropriate for high school students. Id. at 274-76.
84. Id. at 269-70.
85. Id. at 272-73.
86. See infra notes 87-148 and accompanying text (discussing whether Supreme Court
ought to apply strict scrutiny or rational basis analysis to university restrictions of students'
and professors' classroom speech).
87. See Kuhlmejer, 484 U.S. at 267 (addressing issue of whether school newspaper was
public or nonpublic forum in order to determine constitutionality of school's regulation of
student newspaper articles).
88. E.g., Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562 (N.D. Ala. 1990), rev'd, 926 F.2d 1066
(11th Cir. 1991); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991). The principle distinction
between the district and appellate court decisions in Bishop is that the district court determined
that the University had opened its classrooms to all viewpoints, thereby creating a limited
public forum; whereas, the Eleventh Circuit )ruled that the University had not opened it
classrooms for public debate: Bishop, 732 F. Supp. at 1565-66; Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1070-71.
This distinction was very determinative of the outcome, as the district court struck down the
University's regulation and the Eleventh Circuit overturned the district court decision. Bishop,
732 F. Supp. at 1568; Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1077-78.
1568
RELIGION- TAINTED VIEWPOINTS
must provide a compelling interest for restriction on free speech. 9 The strict
scrutiny standard is extremely difficult to satisfy.9 In a nonpublic forum,
on the other hand, the government's restriction need only be reasonable in
light of the forum's purpose and must be viewpoint neutral. 9 Thus, the
issue of whether the government can restrict speech will depend primarily
on whether the forum is public or nonpublic.92 The Supreme Court has
justified the lesser, standard for the nonpublic forum by likening the gov-
ernment's status in a nonpublic forum to a private owner of property, who
may restrict the general public's access to that property.93 Because the
government, like a private owner, may prohibit access to property that
qualifies as a nonpublic forum, the government may impose also discrimi-
natory criteria in granting access 4 Regardless of the forum, however, the
government cannot discriminate against particular viewpoints.95 '
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Bishop v. Aronov9 strongly
indicated that any analysis of the issues in Bishop should not focus on a
public-forum approach.Y The appellate court, nevertheless, relied heavily
89. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(holding that state may place content-based restrictions on speech in public forum only if it
substantiates compelling state interest and state narrowly draws regulation to achieve desired
end).
90. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361-62 (1978) (Brennan, White,
Marshall, Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Court ought
to apply mid-level scrutiny to beneficial race classifications because strict scrutiny analysis
automatically would invalidate statute despite strong state interests); Gerald Gunther, Forward:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HAv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) (arguing that courts' application of strict scrutiny standard is
almost always fatal to statute being reviewed).
91. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (stating that in
non-public forum, such as high school sponsored newspaper, school administrators may place
restrictions on student speech provided restrictions are reasonably related to legitimate peda-
gogical concerns).
92. See supra note 87-92 and accompanying text (arguing that court's determination of
forum status is often determinative of outcome).
93. See Davis v. Massachusetts., 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Davis, 140 Mass. 485 (1886) for proposition that state restriction of public speeches in middle
of interstate highways is comparable to private owner of land forbidding public speech on
that citizen's front lawn); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History
and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. Ray. 1713, 1752 (1987) (noting that theory
that government can regulate use of forum by public is predicated on fact that government,
if it so chose, could completely exclude public).
94. See supra note 93-94 and accompanying text (noting policy justifications behind
government's power to regulate speech in public forum).
95. See Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators ' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)
(stating that government may not enjoin speech simply because it disagrees with speaker's
viewpoint); Geoffrey R. Stone, 25 WM. & MARY L. Ray. 189, 202 (1983) (arguing that equal
treatment of viewpoints is at epicenter of First Amendment protections against government
regulation of free speech).
96. 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991).
97. See Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1070-71 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that Bishop
is not forum case).
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on Kuhlmeier and its progeny, which employed the public-forum analysis. 9
Although the Eleventh Circuit stated that it was attempting to establish a
balance between institutional and individual academic freedom, in fact the
appellate court relied on the principles governing the nonpublic forum
analysis. 99 For example, as a first step, the court indicated that the classroom
is not a public forum during instructional time.' ° The Eleventh Circuit then
analyzed whether the University's restrictions were reasonably related to
pedagogical goals.' 0' The Bishop court's analysis, therefore, clearly resembles
the Kuhlmeier nonpublic forum analysis.' °2 Thus, when the Bishop court
declared that "this is not a forum case," the court must have meant only
that the classroom was a nonpublic forum during instructional periods, not
that the forum analysis was inappropriate in this context. 103
In arriving at the conclusion that the university classroom is a nonpublic
forum during instructional periods, the Bishop court relied heavily on the
principles which Kuhimeier set forth for identifying the forum status of a
scholastic venue.' °4 Kuhlmeier is distinguishable from Bishop, however,
because Kuhlmeier involved school-sponsored speech at the secondary-school
level, whereas Bishop involved university-level speech. 05 The distinction is
98. See Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1074 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260 (1988), as basis of Eleventh Circuit's balancing test for rights of Professor Bishop and
University). Kuhimeier distinguishes between those areas of a school which the school has
opened to the public and those areas to which the school has lent its resources and thereby
bear the imprimatur of the school. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 268-73. Areas which fall into the
second classification, such as a school newspaper that is associated with the curriculum, are
non-public areas. Id. The Bishop court also relied on Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047
(10th Cir. 1990), and Alabama Student Party v. Student Government Association, 867 F.2d
1344 (11th Cir. 1989), as authority for the proposition that a school has a right to control the
speech of its teachers in the classroom because teachers' classroom speech may reasonably be
deemed to bear the imprimatur of the school. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1073.
99. See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (arguing that Bishop court utilized
non-public-forum analysis in arriving at its decision despite court's adamant statement that
Bishop was not forum case).
100. See Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1071 (concluding that University of Alabama had not'opened
up its classrooms for indiscriminate public use during instructional periods).
101. Id. at 1074-75 (holding that University of Alabama is entitled to place restrictions
on classroom activities provided that restrictions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns).
102. Id. In fact, the Bishop court's holding that school administrators do not offend the
First Amendment by regulating the content of speech in school-sponsored; expressive activities
provided that the administrators' actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns is almost a direct quote from the Supreme Court's holding in Hazeiwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1074.
103. See Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1071 (holding that University of Alabama's classrooms are
not public forums).
104. See id. (following Kuhlmeier in holding that school-sponsored, expressive activities
are non-public forums).
105. Compare id. at 1066-68 (noting that Bishop involved speech restrictions at University
of Alabama), with Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 262 (noting that Kuhlmeier involved student speech




significant because one of the major policies behind Kuhimeier is that
primary and secondary schools must be able to restrict and regulate student
and teacher speech in order to fulfill their function to inculcate civic
values.106 Because primary and secondary schools educate a less mature
audience and act as an important source of values for those students, the
Supreme Court has held that those schools may regulate heavily the content
of speech within their facilities provided that the restrictions are rationally
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.107 This policy of inculcating values
is inconsistent, however, with the Supreme Court's description of universities
as marketplaces of ideas.10° Because students at the university level are more
mature than high school students, inculcation of values is an inappropriate
doctrine in the university setting and does not justify the extensive control
of speech that Kuhimeier grants to the secondary schools.' °9
A more appropriate standard for reviewing school regulation of students'
and teachers' speech at the university level is the standard first articulated
in Tinker and utilized as well by the district court in Bishop: That university
officials may not enjoin students' or professors' speech unless the activity
substantially or materially disrupts class." 0 Kuhlmeier's low standard of
review provides little protection to professors' First Amendment rights,
thereby decreasing the diversity of views discussed in America's universi-
106. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 272. The Kuhimeier Court indicates that a secondary school
may discriminate between particular viewpoints in fulfilling its role as an inculcator of civic
values. Id. For example, the Kuhimeier Court stated that a high school could discriminate
against speech that advocated the use of illegal drugs or irresponsible sex. Id. Considering the
fact that many schools promote programs that advance an anti-drug (Say No to Drugs) or a
safe sex theme, discrimination against speech advocating drug use and sex is content-based.
The Court might take a dimmer view of such viewpoint discrimination at the collegiate level,
given universities' mission as the marketplace of ideas. See supra notes 53-56, and accompanying
text (noting that Supreme Court has recognized right of academic freedom which protects and
encourages free exchange of ideas).
107. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 272. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685
(1986) (stating that rights of students in public schools are not as broad as rights of adults in
other forums); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864, 869 (1982) (stating that local school
boards must be allowed to regulate public school curriculum in order to accomplish their
mission to inculcate community values).
108. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981) (stating that college campuses
possess many of characteristics of public forum because of its status as marketplace of ideas);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion) (same);
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (same).
109. Cf. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 n.14, 271 n.10 (noting that university students are
more mature than primary and secondary school students and that universities are open forums
for exchange of ideas). The paradigm of the university campus as an open forum where
mature individuals test and exchange ideas in a search for knowledge seems antithetical to the
paradigm of primary and secondary schools which envisions public schools as an inculcator
of values, thus justifying limitation of free speech. See supra notes 105-13 and accompanying
text (arguing that policies underlying Court's treatment of free speech at primary and secondary
schools are inappropriate at university level).
110. See Clarick, supra note 1, at 732 (arguing that universities should not be allowed to
place restrictions on teachers' speech unless university can show that speech would undermine
educational process).
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ties.' The Court has recognized that diversity of viewpoints, for its own
sake, is a constitutionally fundamental concern of university education."
2
Additionally, the First Amendment rights of teachers ensure that the gov-
ernment cannot successfully inculcate an orthodoxy of state approved ideas
by exerting its considerable influence over the massive public university
system." 3
Despite the important distinctions between the goals of secondary schools
and universities, Kuhimeier indicates unfortunately that the principles gov-
erning the restriction of free expression in high schools are equally applicable
to a university setting."14 Because the Eleventh Circuit was concerned that
school officials, both at the university and secondary school level, must
retain control of the curriculum to accomplish their objectives, the court
used the same principles to analyzespeech at the university and secondary
school levels despite the important difference in their goals." 5 The Eleventh
Circuit observed that if the First Amendment protects a professor's speech
in the classroom, then precedent would require courts to subject any school
111. See Clarick,.supra note 1, at 728-29 (arguing that strict First Amendment protection
encourages teachers to express and discuss wider spectrum of viewpoints and theories). Clarick
argues that diversity of teaching style and classroom environment encourages students to
evaluate the diverse viewpoints and thereby enhances the students' critical thinking skills. Id.
at 724-26.
112. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 340-41 (1978) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion) (holding that University's interest in diverse student body is sufficiently
compelling interest to satisfy strict scrutiny standard that was applied by Court to suspect
classifications such as race); Sweezy v. New Hampshire 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (Warren,
C.J., plurality opinion) (noting that mankind does not have such complete knowledge of any
academic discipline as to preclude usefulness of new theories).
113. See Clarick, supra note 1, at 730 (noting that pervasive size and influence of public
school system makes it an excellent vehicle for government to inculcate government approved
views). See also supra notes 42-47, and accompanying text (noting that teachers' academic
freedom can complement institutional freedom to prevent government control of students'
minds). But see Rust v. Sullivan, I11 S.Ct. 1759, 1776 (1991) (stating that government cannot
constitutionally tie conditions to funding of public university system).
114. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (using indiscriminately
holdings of both university and secondary school cases).
115. See Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that Kuhimeier
standard for determining when school may enjoin expressive activity is equally applicable to
college classroom during instructional periods). The Eleventh Circuit was concerned greatly
that the university must be able to regulate speech in order to fulfill its educational purpose.
Id. at 1075. However, the standard of review articulated in Tinker would permit the university
to censor any speech which materially disrupts its educational operations. See Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). The university may influence
also the professor's conduct through its administration of work evaluations, compensation and
tenure. See generally David M. Rabban, Does Academic Freedom Limit Faculty Autonomy,
66 TEx. L. REv. 1405 (1988) (noting that university review committees have great deal of
coercive force influence over professors' actions). Additionally, professors' ethical conduct is
governed by a code of conduct promulgated by the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP) which mandates that a professor may not abuse his or her position to
indoctrinate students. See American Assoc. of Univ. Professors, Declaration of Principles,
reprinted in Louis Joughin, American Freedom and Tenure, app. A at 170, 173 (1969).
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restrictions on a professor's expressive activity to strict scrutiny." 6 Because
strict scrutiny requires a case-by-case approach in analyzing the legitimacy
of any government regulation on free speech, the court of appeals posited
that imposing such a standard on classroom speech restrictions would
embroil the courts in curriculum decisions." 7 The Eleventh Circuit also
might have been concerned that application of strict scrutiny to school
regulations on expressive activity would violate the principle of institutional
freedom because the federal courts are a branch of the federal government."'
If cases governing restrictions on speech in secondary schools are
applicable to restrictions on speech at the university level, then Kuhimeier
is dispositive on the issue of whether the college classroom is a public forum
during instructional periods." 9 Kuhlmeier held that if the school adminis-
tration reserves the forum for particular school programs or other specific
purposes then the administration has not created a public forum. 20 Kuhl-
meier defines "other specific purposes" to include any activity that the
school affirmatively promotes, such as traditional classroom activities.1
2
1
Kuhlmeier further held that a school does not transform a nonpublic forum
such as the classroom into a public forum merely by sanctioning limited
discourse unless the school intentionally opens the nonpublic forum for
public use.1' " Under the Kuhlmeier approach, because the University of
116. Cf. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1075 (noting that if Court would hold that professors have
independent First Amendment right protecting classroom speech, Court would become "ersatz
deans"). Strict scrutiny analysis is extremely difficult to satisfy. See Gerald Gunther, Forward:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) (arguing that courts' application of strict scrutiny standard is
almost always fatal to statute being reviewed). It is very likely that any restriction the school
would attempt to fashion would fail to satisfy this rigorous standard of review. See Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361-62 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun
J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Court ought to apply mid-level
scrutiny to beneficial race classifications because strict scrutiny analysis automatically would
invalidate statute despite strong state interests).
117. See Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1075 (stating that the courts should not invade province of
school administrators by remaking curriculum decisions).
118. See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amend-
ment," 99 YALE L.J. 251, 304-07 (1989) (arguing that judges are federal officials who threaten
institutional freedom of universities). Although intervention in school operations by the judicial
branch has been found traditionally to be less dangerous than intervention by the executive
or legislative branch, this perception may change given the politicizing of the Supreme Court
and the Court's past willingness to engage in pseudo-legislative activities. Id.
119. See Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1074 (stating that case was controlled by Supreme Court's
decision in Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhimeier).
120. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. V. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (citing Perry Educ.
Assn v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 46, n.7 (1983), for proposition that school
is open forum only if school administration has intentionally opened school facilities to public
by policy or practice).
121. Id. at 270-71.
122. See id. at 267 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 802 (1985), for proposition that government never creates public forum by inaction,
but only when government intentionally opens forum for public discourse). The University of
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Alabama did not intentionally open its classes to the general public for
expressive activity, its classrooms are nonpublic forums during instructional
periods.1
Because Kuhlmeier held that the classroom is a nonpublic forum during
instructional periods, any school regulation of expressive activity in the
classroom must be for reasons that are reasonably related to pedagogical
concerns and must be viewpoint neutral.2 4 One of the University of Ala-
bama's rationales for enjoining Professor Bishop's religious speech was that
the University, not the Professor, should define the scope of the curricu-
lum. 12 Because the primary purpose of a university is to fashion a curriculum
for its students, the Supreme Court most likely would find such a rationale
for enjoining Professor Bishop's comments and optional class to be reason-
able. 
26
Although the Eleventh Circuit did address the reasonableness of the
University of Alabama's restrictions on Professor Bishop's speech, the court
Alabama did encourage its professors to engage in "opinion speech," or speech that does not
fall within the confines of the course description, with their students in order to establish
rapport. Although the University intentionally promoted "opinion speech," such activity
probably does not fall under the rubric of intentionally opening the forum to public discourse.
Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1069.
123. See Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1071 (holding that University of Alabama did not open its
classrooms to public during instructional periods).
124. See supra notes 97-126 and accompanying text (applying forum analysis to college
classroom speech); Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)
(holding that government restrictions in non-public forum must not suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose speaker's view). Some scholars have interpreted this language
in Perry as meaning that the government officials must oppose personally the speaker's views.
See Post, supra note 91, at 1750 (noting that government may place restrictions on speech in
nonpublic forums provided that restrictions are reasonable and are not result of official
opposition to speaker's viewpoint). This construction would mean that the government could
unintentionally engage in viewpoint discrimination without violating the speaker's First Amend-
ment rights. Id. Because viewpoint discrimination is the most abhorrent form of speech
discrimination, this construction would violate the Supreme Court's holding that viewpoint
discrimination of any kind is impermissible. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
125. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1075. The University also claimed that it imposed the restrictions
because the University was concerned that classroom comments and optional classes containing
religious bias may violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 1565.
126. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 809
(1985) (holding that government may choose between different types of nonprofit organizations
in selecting participants for charity drive provided that discrimination is reasonable in light of
purpose of forum). In Cornelius, the Court found that avoidance of controversy was reasonable
in light of the forum's purpose. Id. In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators'
Association, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), the Court evaluated the existence of alternative channels that
remained open for public discussion as a factor bearing on the reasonableness inquiry. Perry
Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 52-53 (1983); see infra, note 129
(describing case background). Professor Bishop had alternative means, such as extracurricular
meetings and seminars, in which to express his views to his students. Deposition of Rodney
Roth, taken 1-5-89, p. 24, lines 1-5. The University's restriction on religious speech and
optional classes involving religious themes would appear to be reasonable under the Court's
analysis in Perry. Perry, 460 U.S. at 52-53.
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did not consider whether these restrictions were viewpoint neutral. 27 In a
nonpublic forum, the government may discriminate permissibly on the basis
of subject matter or speaker identity, but may not discriminate, against
particular viewpoints.'2 The Supreme Court has not clearly differentiated
subject matter discrimination and viewpoint discrimination, but Justice
Brennan provided some guidance in his dissent in Perry Educational Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n.129 Justice Brennan indicated that subject
matter discrimination permits the government to select those subject areas
that are suitable to a particular forum, whereas the requirement of viewpoint
neutrality prohibits discrimination between viewpoints on those selected
subjects. 30 The Eleventh Circuit tackled the subject-matter-based discrimi-
nation versus viewpoint-based discrimination problem in Chandler v. Geor-
gia Public Telecommunications Commission.' The Chandler court addressed
whether a television station engaged in viewpoint discrimination when it
127. See Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1077-78 (noting only that University did not discriminate
against Christian viewpoint only but against all religious viewpoints). Bishop did address
viewpoint discrimination, but only in the context of an Establishment Clause violation. See
Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1077 (noting that University of Alabama enjoined Professor Bishop's
speech because the University did not want to appear to support Professor Bishop's religious
viewpoint). Professor Bishop argued that the University, by excluding religious speech, was
establishing a religion itself, namely atheism. Id. The Eleventh Circuit held that such restrictions
did not advance any religion but were an attempt to maintain a neutral, secular forum. Id.
128. See Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators ' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983)
(stating that the school did not discriminate between unions on basis of viewpoint but rather
on basis of union's status). In Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), the government
impermissibly discriminated on the basis of content, favoring secular student groups over
religious student groups. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269. In Hazelwood School Dist v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260 (1988), the Court was careful to note that the school officials discriminated on
the basis of emotionally mature topics that were inappropriate for secondary school students
rather than on hostility to the speakers' viewpoints. Kuhlmeier 484 U.S. at 272.
129. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). As part of a collective bargaining agreement, the Board of
Education designated the Perry Education Association (PEA) as the exclusive representative
for the school district's teachers. Perry, 460 U.S. at 39-41. The collective bargaining agreement
also contained a clause whereby the PEA would have exclusive access to the teachers' school
mailboxes. Id. The Perry Local Educators' Association (PLEA) brought suit against PEA and
school officials, contending that the exclusive access policy violated the First Amendment and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 41. The Court held that
the school board had not violated PLEA's First Amendment rights because it had reserved
the forum (the mailboxes) for other intended purposes. Id. at 48. Because the school board
had restricted access to the mailboxes, they were not a public forum. Id. The Court stated
that in a nonpublic forum, the school board's restriction of access to PLEA need only have
a rational basis. Id. at 49. The Court held that the school board's interest in complying with
its collective bargaining agreement is a sufficiently rational reason to withstand PLEA's First
Amendment claim. Id. at 50-53.
130. Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 59, 61 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See Paul B. Stephan, III, The First Amendment and Content
Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REv. 203, 218 (1982) (arguing that government engages in viewpoint
discrimination when it singles out particular views or ideas for regulation while exhibiting no
control over closely related or directly competing ideas); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 879 (1982) (holding that government permissibly may discriminate between ideas).
131. 917 F.2d 486 (11th Cir. 1990).
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excluded the Libertarian candidate for lieutenant governor from a debate
which involved Republican and Democratic candidates.' Chandler held that
the government was not discriminating against the excluded speaker's view-
point, but rather that the government discriminated only against the can-
didate's status as a minority party candidate. 3 3 Chandler held that
administrators of the forum could discriminate provided that the officials
were not motivated by opposition to the speaker's views.1
4
Bishop is distinguishable from Chandler because in Chandler the forum
administrators did not discriminate against individual's opinion, but rather
against his status as a minority candidate and the limited resources of the
television station. 3 5 In Bishop, however, the University of Alabama generally
permitted all opinion speech except that with religious overtones. 36 As an
example, the University of Alabama's restriction would not prevent a
Marxist from revealing his political opinions in his physiology course, but
would prevent a professor from revealing his religious opinions in a sociology
course.
The Eleventh Circuit characterized the University of Alabama's injunc-
tion against Professor Bishop's religious speech as subject matter discrimi-
nation because the University simply was limiting the exercise physiology
curriculum so as not to include religious topics.17 The district court, on the
other hand, characterized the University of Alabama's restriction as view-
point-based discrimination for several reasons.' First, the record in Bishop
showed that the University of Alabama did not prohibit other faculty
members from engaging in speech involving personal views and opinions
that were outside the stated curricula for their courses. 39 In fact, the
University of Alabama actually encouraged other faculty members to engage
in opinion speech to establish a rapport with students and to facilitate
academic freedom. 40 Second, the University's speech restriction only pro-
132. Chandler v. Georgia Public Telecommunications Comm'n, 917 F.2d at 487-88.
133. Id. at 489.
134. Id. at 489 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 800 (1985), for proposition that government impermissibly discriminates against viewpoints
only when it intentionally enjoins particular viewpoint on basis of hostility toward that
viewpoint).
135. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text (noting that Chandler court held that
television station had discriminated on basis of speaker's status and not speaker's viewpoint).
136. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text (noting that University of Alabama
prohibited Professor Bishop from interjecting personal religious beliefs into classroom discus-
sion).
137. Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (lth Cir. 1991). The Bishop court indicated
that the University of Alabama wished only to prohibit Professor Bishop from making
comments about religion which were unrelated to the subject matter of his course. Id. at 1075.
138. See Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562, 1568 (N.D. Ala. 1990), rev'd, 926 F.2d
1066 (l1th Cir. 1991) (stating that University of Alabama's speech restriction only enjoins
Christian perspectives on academic topics and does not address Jewish, Hindu or other religious
viewpoints that might be brought up in classroom).
139. Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1069 (lth Cir. 1991).
140. See id. at 1069, 1071 (finding opinion speech to be norm, provided that it did not
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hibited the discussion of Christian perspectives and not the perspectives of
other religions' 41 Additionally, the idea of grand design in human evolution
is a valid scientific viewpoint on the subject of the development of human
physiology. 42 Thus, the University of Alabama's speech restriction appar-
ently constitutes viewpoint discrimination and is, therefore invalid despite
its rational relationship to legitimate pedagogical concerns.
43
Assuming that the University of Alabama is engaging in viewpoint
discrimination by proscribing professors from making comments of a relig-
ious nature during instructional periods, the University is violating its
professors' First Amendment rights. 44 The appropriate level of review for
First Amendment violations is strict scrutiny. 45 To have its prohibition
upheld, the University bears a heavy burden to prove that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn
to achieve that end. 46 Although there were arguments at trial concerning
whether the regulation was sufficiently narrow to satisfy the second prong
of this test, 4 the first prong of this test, evaluating the compelling interest
interfere with basic curriculum and finding that University of Alabama endorsed use of opinion
speech by faculty to establish rapport with students).
141. See supra note 18 (quoting University of Alabama's memo to Professor Bishop); see
also Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562, 1568 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (noting that University of
Alabama's speech restriction only addresses Christian doctrines), rev'd, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th
Cir. 1991).
142. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 612 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
that some agnostic scientists who are adherents of evolutionary theory also recognize existence
of evidence consistent with Judeo-Christian theories of origin).
143. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text (arguing that University of Alabama's
speech restriction constitutes viewpoint discrimination).
144. See Cornelius v. NAACP Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (holding
that government violates speaker's First Amendment rights when it engages in viewpoint
discrimination absent compelling interest); see also, Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70
(1981) (holding that University of Missouri at Kansas City abridged plaintiff's First Amendment
rights when University engaged in content-based discrimination absent compelling interest by
prohibiting religious groups from using facilities because of religious viewpoint).
145. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 n.7 (1981) (citing Healy v. James, 408
U.S. 169, 180 (1972), for proposition that burden of proof rests decidedly with university to
show that its regulation is appropriate when university impinges on students' First Amendment
rights).
146. Id. at 271.
147. See Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562, 1566 (N.D. AL 1990), rev'd, 926 F.2d
1066 (11th Cir. 1991) (discussing plaintiff's argument that University of Alabama's regulation
was overbroad); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1070-71 (11th Cir. 1991) (same). Plaintiff
argued that the University's regulation prohibiting any religious commentary proscribed him
from teaching about the history of physiology, much of which concerned theories of creationism
formulated in medieval European Universities. Bishop, 732 F.Supp. at 1566. The appellate
court did not accept the plaintiff's argument, stating that when the court encounters a facial
challenge to a statute, it will uphold that statute if it is amenable to a narrow construction
that would make it constitutional. See Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1071 (citing Virginia v. American
Booksellers Assoc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988), as precedent for narrow construction of statutes
when addressing facial challenges). The appellate court held that Professor Bishop should.
understand simply by applying standards of professionalism that the regulation meant he
should separate his personal and professional beliefs. Id.
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ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND ACADEmiC FREEDOM
To satisfy the first prong of the strict scrutiny standard, the University
of Alabama advanced two rationales for its regulation barring religious
speech. 49 First, the University of Alabama alleged that it had a compelling
interest in controlling the content of its curriculum.Iso Second, the University
argued that it would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment if it permitted religious opinion speech in its classrooms.' 5 ' The
Eleventh Circuit in Bishop relied heavily on the first rationale and did not
reach the Establishment Clause argument.152 The Eleventh Circuit used a
rational basis standard of review to analyze whether the University's interest
in controlling its curriculum was sufficiently compelling to justify impinging
on its professors' free speech rights.' 53 However, because this case involves
viewpoint discrimination, the Eleventh Circuit should have applied a strict
scrutiny standard.'
The Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a school's interest
in its curriculum was a sufficiently compelling interest to satisfy strict
148. Cf. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1071-77 (evaluating University of Alabama's interest in
regulating 'speech of its students and professors).
149. Deposition of Carl Westerfield, taken 1-5-89, p. 15, line 14 - p.16, line 19 (stating
that University of Alabama originally took action against Professor Bishop's religious classroom
comments in response to student complaints). As it turned out, only one student had complained
about Professor Bishop's -religious speech. Deposition of Phillip A. Bishop, taken 3-14-89, p.
81, line 2 - p. 82, line 3.
150. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1074, 1077.
151. Id. a
152. Id. at 1077. Although the appellate court did not reach the Establishment Clause
issue, it noted that the University's concern would be justified if one of its professors engaged
in proselytizing in the classroom. Id. In particular, the appellate court found that Professor
Bishop's optional class particularly was suspect as an Establishment Clause violation. Id.
153. See id. at 1074 (relying on language in Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 266-67 (1988), indicating that high schools should be able to place reasonable restrictions
on school-sponsored speech). It should be noted that the proscribed speech in Kuhimeier would
fall within the ambit of subject matter discrimination. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260 (1988) (holding that school may prohibit speech on sensitive topics). For example,
students could not put articles in the paper that dealt with adult subjects like pregnancy. Id.
at 263. Thus, Kuhlmeier is not a case of viewpoint-based discrimination as defined for the
purposes of this article. See supra notes 129-34, and accompanying text (arguing that subject
matter discrimination involves excluding certain topics from forum whereas viewpoint discrim-
ination involves excluding certain viewpoints that are related to otherwise permissible topics).
154. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981) (holding that University of
Missouri at Kansas City's prohibition against religious student groups using university facilities
violates student's First Amendment rights and that, absent university's compelling interest,
prohibition is unconstitutional); see supra notes 105-13, and accompanying text (arguing that
rational basis test is too low level of review at university level because of distinctions between
students' analytical abilities and schools' educational goals at different levels).
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scrutiny in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District.'5 5 In Tinker,
the Court held that a school's interest in controlling its curriculum was
insufficient to justify the abridgement of its teachers' and students' First
Amendment rights unless the speech causes significant disruption and inter-
ference in the classroom. 56 Because no University of Alabama administrator,
professor, or student asserted that Professor Bishop's remarks materially
disrupted the educational process, the University cannot justify, as a com-
pelling interest, its concern for the content of 4ts curriculum.'5 7 The Uni-
versity of Alabama's interest in adhering to the constitutional requirements
of the Establishment Clause, on the other hand, is a sufficiently compelling
interest to satisfy'strict scrutiny. 5 The Establishment Clause protects against
government action that tends to involve or encroach on religious concerns.Y5 9
The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from actively or pas-
sively supporting a particular religious sect.16' If the Establishment Clause
is not triggered by Professor Bishop's comments, however, then there is no
155. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
156. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (holding
school's regulation against wearing of armbands unconstitutional because armbands did not
materially disrupt class).
157. Deposition of Rodney Roth, taken 1-5-89, p. 29, lines 1-6 (asserting that University
of Alabama regarded Professor Bishop to be excellent instructor and that he was making
steady progress toward early tenure). The only evidence of a disruption in Professor Bishop's
classroom was the single student complaint that Professor Bishop's comments were offensive.
Deposition of Phillip A. Bishop, taken 3-14-89, p. 81, line 2 - p. 82, line 3. As noted by the
Ninth Circuit in Grove v. Mead School District No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985), the fact that speech is offensive is not a sufficient basis for the
government to enjoin it:
The inevitability of this conflict between plaintiffs' religious rejection of "seculari-
zation" and the secularization of society suggests why antipathy alone ... is never
enough to sustain a free exercise challenge. Plaintiffs are religiously offended by a
particular novel; others previously before us have been religiously offended by
Trident submarines or the nuclear arms race. Were the free exercise clause violated
whenever government activity is offensive to or at variance with sincerely held
religious precepts, virtually no governmental program would be constitutionally
possible.
Id. at 1542.
158. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271 (holding that university's interest in complying with
Establishment Clause was compelling interest); see also, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436
(1962) (holding that New York statute requiring recitation of non-denominational prayer in
public schools violated Establishment Clause because statute had primary effect of advancing
religion).
159. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that state funding of teaching
of secular subjects in parochial schools is unconstitutional); see also Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664 (1980) (upholding government's granting of tax-exempt status to churches as not
violative of Establishment Clause).
160. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1982) (stating that mere
appearance of government action favoring particular religious sect is of great symbolic
importance to that sect); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-
5, at 825 (Ist ed. 1978) (arguing that perception of public school endorsement of particular
religion constitutes especially egregious violation of Establishment Clause because public schools
are primary medium used to inculcate values in American youth).
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need to discuss whether those comments violated the Establishment Clause
using the test outlined in Lemon v. Kurtzman.'6'
Triggering the Establishment Clause
The facts in Bishop do not trigger the Establishment Clause for two
reasons: first, Professor Bishop's students could not have perceived that his
comments bore the imprimatur of the University; and second, Professor
Bishop's comments were not truly religious. 62 The Establishment Clause is
implicated only when the government intentionally supports or undermines
a particular religious sect, or when it is likely that the public will perceive
that the government seeks to support or undermine a particular religion. 63
With regard to the first factor that triggers the Establishment Clause, the
Court may look at Professor Bishop's background to determine if Professor
Bishop made his comments with an intent to support "refigion.'6 Professor
Bishop is an avowed Christian and had, at one time, advocated special
scholarships for Christian students. 65 The Court could infer from these
facts that Professor Bishop intended to indoctrinate his students.'6 Professor
Bishop's actions, however, refute this notion. Professor Bishop's candid
exposure of his bias and his invitation to students to critically analyze his
statements clearly indicate that Professor Bishop did not intend to indoc-
trinate. 67
The motivating concern behind the second factor that triggers the
Establishment Clause is that students might perceive that the school en-
courages them to adopt a particular religious viewpoint when religion enters
the classroom. ' This is especially true at the primary and secondary school
161. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See infra note 206 and accompanying text (noting that if
Professor Bishop's opinion speech during instructional periods did trigger Establishment Clause
then Court must apply three prong test which Court first articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
162. See infra notes 162-205 and accompanying text (arguing that Professor Bishop's
comments do not trigger Establishment Clause).
163. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 n.1 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(stating that central concern of Establishment Clause is that public not perceive government
as supporting particular religion).
164. See generally Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (discussing past history of
Arkansas state legislature in determining nature of legislature's intent in promulgating statute
that mandates that Scientific Creationism be taught whenever evolutionary theory is studied).
165. Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1068, 1069 n.2 (11th Cir. 1991).
166. See generally Edwards, 482 U.S. at 589 (noting that Arkansas state legislature had
history of promulgating statutes which promoted religion).
167. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1068.
168. See Nadine Strossen, "Secular Humanism" and "Scientific Creationism": Proposed
Standards for Reviewing Curricular Decisions Affecting Students' Religious Freedom, 47 Omo
ST. L.J. 333, 359 (1986) (noting that Supreme Court's primary concern has invariably been
that students will perceive that government supports religion if public school curriculum
includes religious material); see also TRINE, supra note 160, at 825 (noting that Supreme Court
has held that public school's symbolic support of religion violates Establishment Clause);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding unconstitutional statute that requires equal
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level where -students are at very impressionable ages. 169 The perceived in-
doctrination is particularly egregious in a scholastic setting because students
are a captive audience and under great pressure to assimilate themselves. 170
Thus, the Court has struck down statutes which authorize the school to
release students from regular classes to attend special on-campus religious
classes, 171 programs that mandate the teaching of Scientific Creationism,
72
as well as policies that allow for the reading of a nondenominational prayer'"
or a moment of silence at the beginning of each school day. 74
The reasons for finding Establishment Clause violations for religious
activity by teachers at the primary and secondary level are not as salient at
the undergraduate and graduate school level. 175 College students are less
impressionable than their primary and secondary school counterparts and,
therefore, less likely to feel pressured by religious ideas or doctrines. 76 In
time for Scientific Creationism whenever public schools include evolutionary theory in curric-
ulum because students might well perceive that government advocates Judeo-Christian religious
traditions).
169. See Strossen, supra note 168, at 370 (citing Jesse H. Choper, Religion in the Public
Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 MIN. L. Rnv. 329, 343-44 (1963), for
proposition that students at primary and secondary school level are under powerful compulsion
to conform, so that religious material in curriculum will strongly pressure students in religious
minority to adopt religious viewpoints); FCC.v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 757-58 (1978)
(recognizing that public has right to control more actively children's access to information
than adults' because 'a child ... is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice
which is presupposition of First Amendment guarantees'); see also, supra notes 105-13 and
accompanying text (arguing that courts should not treat First Amendment rights of under-
graduate and graduate students the same as primary and secondary school students due to
increased maturity of students and different functions of forums).
170. See Strossen, supra note 168, at 369 (noting that state compulsory education laws
require that children attend school); see also Charles L. Black, Jr., He Cannot Choose But
Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 960 (1953) (arguing that
government has deprived commuters riding on public buses of their liberty by subjecting riders
to radio advertisement that subconsciously affects riders' behavior).
171. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (holding that Illinois program
which permitted students to elect to leave regular classes and attend religious classes violated
Establishment Clause because program indirectly coerced students to attend religious classes).
172. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding unconstitutional statute that
required equal time for Scientific Creationism whenever public schools taught evolutionary
theory because schoolchildren might well perceive that government advocates Judeo-Christian
explanation for origin of human life). U
173. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding unconstitutional New York statute
requiring mandatory prayer in public schools).
174. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding unconstitutional Alabama statute
requiring one minute period of silence at beginning of class).
175. See supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text (arguing that universities ha e different
educational purpose than primary and secondary schools which requires that courts subject
speech restrictions to higher level of scrutiny at collegiate level than at primary and secondary
school level).
176. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1976) (stating that college students are
much less impressionable and will approach opinions and doctrines with skeptical eye); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981) (noting that college students are less impressionable
than younger students and are able to make Valid and informed judgments as to whether
university is supporting or undermining religion).
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fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that the public university system
ought to provide university students with a skeptical academic environment
and expose students to a wide variety of ideas and doctrines.' 77
Because university students attend a variety of classes that expose
students to varying and often conflicting opinions of different professors,
it is unlikely that a student could point to the personal comments of a
single professor and perceive that the professor's ideas bear the imprimatur
of the university.'178 The situation is similar to that presented in Widmar v.
Vincent.' 79 In Widmar, the University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC)
was concerned that it would violate the Establishment Clause by allowing
a student religious organization to use its facilities, thereby causing other
students to perceive that UMKC supported a particular religious sect. i' ° The
Widnar Court reasoned that because the university's facilities were open to
all groups, it did not confer any special benefit on one particular view-
point. 8' Widmar suggests that whenever the university provides open access
to its facilities, the use of the facility by a religious group does not violate
the Establishment Clause.'8 2 Thus, in a more narrow sense, because the
University of Alabama allows and encourages professors to use their class-
177. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (stating that university
ought to be market place of ideas). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its view that the
university ought to be a marketplace of ideas in Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 1776 (1991),
wherein the Court held that the Secretary of Health and Human Services did not violate the
First Amendment when it placed content-based restrictions on the doctor-patient dialogue in
a federally funded abortion clinic. Rust, 111 S.Ct. at 1778. Despite upholding the restrictions
on such an important communication, the Court stated that such restrictions would not
withstand judicial scrutiny when placed on university speech. Id. The Rust Court noted that
the university was a "traditional sphere of free expression fundamental to the functioning of
society." Id.
178. See Deposition of Rodney Roth, taken 1-5-89, p. 48, line 15 - p. 56, line 17 (stating
that, according to University of Alabama Faculty Handbook, professors' statements of personal
beliefs and bias in classroom are appropriate); see also Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562,
1564 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (stating that professors at University of Alabama often discussed their
personal beliefs and theories in classroom to establish rapport with students), rev'd, 926 F.2d
1066 (lth Cir. 1991); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 756 (1976)
(stating that professors at undergraduate level exercise academic freedom when they display
religious symbols in classroom, wear religious garb or even open class with prayer). When the
Court indicates that an activity falls within the ambit of academic freedom, that activity does
not bear on the imprimatur of the school. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14,
271 n.10 (1981) (noting that students are unlikely to perceive that university is imposing a
particular viewpoint when professors and students freely discuss that viewpoint under auspices
of their First Amendment rights). If a professor's decision to incant a prayer in the classroom
does not indicate an intentional action on the part of the school to promote a religion, then
neither should a teacher's decision to make admittedly personal observations with religious
connotation indicate that the school promotes those observations. Cf. Roemer, 426 U.S. at
756 (stating that teacher's choice to wear clerical garb or to open class with daly prayer is an
aspect of academic freedom and does not bear imprimatur of university).
179. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
180. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271-72 (1981).




rooms to advance and debate personal insights, the University does not
violate the Establishment Clause when its professor espouses a viewpoint
that has a religious connotation.' 3
In Bishop, it is even more unlikely that a student would perceive that
Professor Bishop's comments bore the imprimatur of the University of
Alabama because he specifically qualified his comments as reflecting his
own personal bias.'8 The Supreme Court has held that such a disclaimer
could disassociate effectively a person who might normally be associated
with the expression of certain ideas.' 5 In Pruneyard Shopping Center. v.
Robins'" the Court addressed whether requiring a shopping center owner
to allow individuals to hand out political pamphlets violated the owner's
First Amendment rights by forcing him to become associated with speech
that the owner found to be repugnant.' 7 The Pruneyard Court held that a
disclaimer by the shopping center owner would effectively disassociate the
owner from the objectionable speech and satisfy the First Amendment.'
As in Pruneyard, Professor Bishop's warning to his students that the
statements he made reflected his own personal bias effectively disassociated
the University from his statements, thereby further preventing students from
perceiving that the University supported Professor Bishop's viewpoint. 8 9
183. See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text (arguing that university does not
confer imprimatur on religious classroom comments of its professor because college students
encounter personal opinions from other professors and thereby are disabused of any notion
that particular professor is proclaiming university policy).
184. See Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1068 (1lth Cir. 1991) (noting that Professor
Bishop warned students he was espousing his own personal viewpoints). In fact, Professor
Bishop encouraged his students to filter out his bias. Id.
185. See infra notes 186-89, and accompanying text (arguing that disclaimer can effectively
remove perception that speech has imprimatur of owner of forum).
186. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
187. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)J
188. Id. at 87. This case arose when a security guard at the Pruneyard Shopping Center
prevented Robins from soliciting signatures for a petition that objected to a United Nations
resolution. Id. at 77-79. The Court held that Pruneyard had violated Robin's First Amendment
rights because the shopping center, which was open to the public, had become a quasi-public
forum. Id. at 83-84. The Court rejected Pruneyard's claim that by not allowing Pruneyard to
exclude Robins, the government was taking his property. Id. The Court noted. that the
government's taking of Pruneyard's right to exclude did not materially effect the value of the
shopping center. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that the government did not take Pruneyard's
property without due process because Pruneyard did not lose any substantial rights. Id. The
Court also rejected Pruneyard's argument that the Court's decision violated the First Amend-
ment rights of Pruneyard's owner by forcing the owner to become associated with speech and
viewpoints that the owner did not support. Id. at 85-89. The Court stated that Pruneyard
could post disclaimers which would effectively disassociate Pruneyard's owner from any speech
occurring in the shopping center. Id.
189. See Strossen, supra note 168, at 383 (arguing that discussion of religious viewpoints
and beliefs in public schools is not violative of Establishment Clause if students and professors
are discussing viewpoints in academic setting where students are encouraged to objectively
analyze and critique various doctrines and if administration gives students options as to which
areas they would like to explore). Professor Strossen argues that statements by school officials,
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Bishop does not implicate the Establishment Clause concerns because
Bishop's classroom comments were not truly "religious" in nature.' 90 In
class, Professor Bishop would observe an intricate feature of human phys-
iology and would conclude that such unfathomable complexity belied any
creationary theory which provided that human development was guided only
by chance.' 9' As Professor Bishop noted, this comment is philosophical or
ontological in nature, rather than an espousal of a religion per se. 19
Professor Bishop's comments are quite unlike the classroom speech which
the Supreme Court has found to violate the Establishment Clause. Professor
Bishop's comments did not involve religious incantations such as mandatory
prayers or moments of silence' 93 nor did the comments favor a particular
religious sect such as mandatory teaching of Scientific Creationism. 9 In
fact, Professor Bishop's comments appear .to be less an indoctrination of
religion than the teaching of religious doctrines and philosophies in religion
classes.195 The fact that some agnostic scientists maintain that there is
indicating their actual position on the religious materials, will remove any imprimatur of
religion from the public school and government. See id. (citing Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), for proposition that disclosure by owner of forum can remove
perception of support of speech that occurs within forum); see also U.S. S.W. Afr./Namib.
Trade & Cultural Council v. United States, 708 F.2d 760, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that
FAA can prevent public perception that government supports political opinions advertized in
displays in Dulles International Airport and Washington National Airport by posting disclaimers
near displays); McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716, 728-29 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that govern-
ment's posting of disclaimers, coupled with secular purpose of providing public forum, ensures
that public will properly perceive that creche display in public park does not bear imprimatur
of government), aff'd mem., 471 U.S. 83 (1985).
190. See Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562, 1566 (N.D. Aa. 1990) (indicating that
Professor Bishop's speech amounted to exchange of ideas between professors and students),
rev'd, 926 F.2d 1066 (1991); see also, David S. Caudill, Law and Worldview: Problems in the
Creation-Science Controversy, 3 J.L. & RELiGION1 1 (1985) (arguing that evolution is as religious
in nature as Scientific Creationism because both rely on major assumptions or "fundamental
beliefs" as centerpiece for their worldview). Professor Bishop's comments, however, do not
seem to rise to even the level of scientific creationism because they indicate only that some
guiding sentient force is responsible for human development. See Deposition of Phillip A.
Bishop, taken. 3-14-89, p.30, line 4 - p. 31, line 12 (stating Professor Bishop's comments are
based on probabilities and other scientific evidence).
191. Deposition of Phillip A. Bishop, taken 3-14-89, p. 18, line 21 - p. 20, line 11.
192. See Deposition of Phillip A. Bishop, taken 3-14-89, p. 18, lines 14-16 (stating that
Professor Bishop did not consider his classroom statements to be religious and that he used
term God in generic sense of grand designer); see also id. at p. 26, lines 14-17 (indicating that
Professor Bishop had been conveying his view of truth in philosophical sense).
193. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding unconstitutional New York statute
requiring mandatory prayer in public schools); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding
unconstitutional Alabama statute requiring one minute period of silence at beginning of class).
194. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding unconstitutional Arkansas
statute that required teachers to teach Scientific Creationism whenever teacher included evo-
lutionary theory in curriculum).
195. See Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562, 1567 (N.D. Aia. 1990) (noting that
Professor Bishop's classroom comments do not advance religion nearly as much as University
of Alabama's regular religion and theology courses), rev'd, 926 F.2d 1066 (1lth Cir. 1991).
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evidence that implies a theory of origin consistent with Professor Bishop's
comments indicates that his comments are not mere religious dogma. 96
Professor Nadine Strossen asserts that the Court will have to engage in
an increasingly more intensive examination of the purposes and effects of
"religious" statements or activity as those statements and activities further
differ from traditional religious forms. 97 Professor Strossen argues that the
courts should not consider a government statement or activity to violate the
Establishment Clause if the statement or activity is analytical rather than
indoctrinating in nature. 98 In fact, the Supreme Court has found that the
teaching of Christian or other religious doctrines in a public school does
not violate the Establishment Clause because the teacher presented the
subject in an objective and analytical manner. 99 Applying this analysis to
the Bishop case, although Professor Bishop's comments did have religious
connotations, he presented the comments in a philosophical context.20
Professor Bishop identified his bias and invited the students to filter and
analyze his statements. 20 1 He advanced these statements in order to encourage
196. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 612 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that some agnostic
scientists who are adherents of evolutionary theory also recognize existence of evidence that is
consistent with Judeo-Christian theories of origin).
197. See Strossen, supra note 168, at 372-73 (noting that Supreme Court's decisions
striking down religion in schools primarily involved cases where sectarian religious doctrine
and ceremonies were included in public school curriculum). Professor Strossen argues that the
Supreme Court would have to take a closer look at a case which involved the teaching of
religion in public schools in a critical and analytical fashion. Id.
198. See Strossen, supra note 168, at 358-59 (arguing that if teachers presented religious
beliefs in analytical fashion, rather than inculcative fashion, Establishment Clause concerns
would be minimalized because students would not perceive that beliefs bore imprimatur of
school administration). Professor Strossen cites as support for her conclusion the dicta in
School District v.Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, (1963), and Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42
(1980), wherein the Court indicates that public school teachers would not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause by teaching religious beliefs in the classroom if the religious material were
taught in a neutral, objective and critical atmosphere. Id. at 358-59. Professor Strossen
develops a list of factors to determine whether a subject is being taught in an analytical
manner:
I. Whether a subject of reasonable dispute is presented as a theory or opinion.
2. Whether there are competing theories with similar degrees of acceptance.
3. Whether alternate theories are presented.
4. Whether students are encouraged to be critical.
5. Whether students can select from a range of materials representing diverse viewpoints.
6. Whether students' grade depends on a critical analysis of the material rather than rote
regurgitation.
7. Whether school officials explain to students that the school does not favor any one particular
viewpoint.
Id. at 383.
199. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (stating that public schools
would not violate Establishment Clause by including Bible in school curriculum provided that
study was conducted in secular and academic manner).
200. See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text (noting that Professor Bishop exposed
his bias and explained that there were other viewpoints on subject).
201. See supra note 11 (recounting text of Professor Bishop's classroom remarks).
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his students to analyze critically the physiology material. 202 Additionally,
Professor Bishop used a blind grading system and his exams did not cover
this "enrichment" material. 2 3 From this evidence, it seems that Professor
Bishop made his comments in an analytical, rather than indoctrinating,
setting.204 Because Professor Bishop's comments did not bear the imprimatur
of the University of Alabama and were not truly religious statements, it
appears that the comments do not trigger the Establishment Clause. 20 5
Establishment Clause Analysis
Assuming ad arguendo that Professor Bishop's comments implicate
Establishment Clause concerns, the Court must determine if the government
action in question violates the Establishment Clause by applying the three
part test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.206 The governmental action in
question: 1) must have a secular purpose; 2) must have a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion and 3) must not foster excessive
government entanglement with religion. 207 The government activity must
satisfy all three of the Lemon criteria or the Court will find it violative of
the Establishment clause. 20 1 In Bishop, the governmental activity in question
202. See Deposition of Phillip A. Bishop, taken 3-14-89, p. 23, line 8 - p. 24 line 22
(stating that Professor Bishop made statements relating to "designer" or "god" to encourage
students to more complex usage of curriculum). Professor Bishop cites Bloom's taxonomy
which sets out the five levels of knowledge and cognitive function. Id.
203. See Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562, 1564 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (noting that
Professor Bishop used blind grading system), rev'd, 926 F.2d 1066 (1991); Deposition of Phillip
A. Bishop, taken 3-14-89, p. 38, lines 22-3, p. 89, lines 7-8 (indicating that Professor Bishop
did not think his conversations concerning evidence of designer in human evolution to be
testable material).
204. See supra notes 197-203 and accompanying text (arguing that Professor Bishop used
comments to foster academic curiosity rather than religious indoctrination).
205. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text (arguing that Professor Bishop's
comments do not bear the imprimatur of University because Professor Bishop disclaimed the
comments as his bias); see also supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text (arguing that
Professor Bishop's comments do not bear the imprimatur of University because college level
students are sufficiently mature to perceive that their various professors are articulating
personal, not university supported, opinions); supra notes 176-83 and accompanying text
(arguing that Professor Bishop's comments were based on academic curiosity rather than
religious indoctrination).
206. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon addressed the issue of whether the government violates
the Establishment Clause when it gives financial operating aid to parochialschools. Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1971). The Court devised a three part test to evaluate
Establishment Clause violations which mandated that government actions must: 1) must have
a secular purpose; 2) must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion
and 3) must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13. The
Court held that the school aid programs violated the entanglement prong because the goverh-
ment would have to monitor closely parochial school operations to ensure that government
funds were not used for religious purposes. Id. at 619-20.
207. Id. at 612-13. The Court is currently reconsidering the usefulness of the Lemon test
in Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S.Ct. 2822 (1991).
208. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
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was Professor Bishop articulating his theory that a designer of human
evolution exists.
To determine whether the government acted with a secular purpose, the
Supreme Court has looked at both the stated intentions of the government
actor 2°9 and the legislative history of the act. 210 Professor Bishop stated that
his purpose in presenting the material was to foster thought and to encourage
his students to analyze and synthesize the basic physiology material.21' In
addition, Professor Bishop felt it his duty as a teacher to discuss with his
students his personal viewpoints on the; material.
21 2
Next, the Court must consider whether Professor Bishop's statements
have the primary effect of advancing religion .2 1 The Court has held that
government action has the primary effect of advancing religion when it
supports an institution in which religious doctrines dominate or when it
specifically funds religious activity in what otherwise would be a secular
setting. 2 4 Professor Bishop's comments hardly could be said to dominate
the classroom as they accounted for a very small fraction of the class
time.21s University officials consistently gave Professor Bishop high marks
as a teacher, indicating that he was faithfully and successfully teaching the
course material and not allowing his class to be subsumed by religious
doctrine or his personal beliefs. 2 6 The University did not specifically fund
209. See id. (stating that proposed legislation to aid parochial education satisfied first
prong of test because legislators indicated that their purpose was to promote better secular
education in private schools).
210. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (concluding that legislation had
sectarian purpose after reviewing past attempts of legislature to force Scientific Creationism
on schools).
211. See supra notes 200-04 (noting that Professor Bishop included personal opinions in
classroom discussion to encourage students to engage in higher applications of basic physiology
curriculum).
212. See Deposition of Phillip A. Bishop, taken 3-14-89, p. 26, lines 9-17 (stating that
Professor Bishop, in making his classroom comments, complied with guidelines set forth by
Association of American University Professors which ethically mandates that university pro-
fessors convey truth as professors see it); see also Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562, 1564
(N.D. Ala. 1990) (stating that professors at University of Alabama often discussed their
personal beliefs and theories in the classroom to establish rapport with students), rev'd, 926
F.2d 1066 (l1th Cir. 1991).
213. See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text (outlining criteria of Lemon test for
determining if government act violates Establishment Clause).
214. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973) (stating that government violates
second prong of Lemon test when it funds institutions which are subsumed by religious activity
or when government specifically supports religion in otherwise secular forum).
215. Deposition of Phillip A. Bishop, taken 3-14-89, p. 96, lines 2-10. Professor Bishop
indicated that his comments regarding his personal bias and the comments regarding evidence
of "God" in human physiology accounted for approximately five minutes out of a total 2250
minutes of instructional time. Id.
216. See Deposition of Rodney Roth, taken 1-5-89, p. 28, line 22 - p. 30, line 3 (stating
that Professor Bishop was making very good progress toward eventual tenure). In fact, the
University of Alabama was contemplating conferring early tenure on Professor Bishop at the
time that the University sanctioned him for his classroom comments and optional class. Id.
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religion, 2 7 and no indication exists that the University, by funding different
classes, intended to adopt or support the views of the various professors
whom the University encouraged to share views with their classes.
28
The Lemon test also requires the Court to examine whether Professor
Bishop's statements excessively entangle the government with religion.
21 9
Although this is a rather vague test,220 it does not appear that Professor
Bishop's comments, which account for a minuscule proportion of class
time, excessively entangle the University of Alabama with religion.' On
the other hand, the University of Alabama's regulation prohibiting expres-
sion of personal religious viewpoints in the classroom does appear to
excessively entangle the University with religion. As the Court noted in
Widmar v. Vincent, regulations that exclude religious groups from meeting
on university grounds require the university to determine what is and what
is not a religious group and to police meetings to make sure that no religious
activities take place. 2m The University of Alabama's regulation against
The University awards early tenure only in cases of superior scholarship and pedagogy. Id.
The University since has awarded tenure to Professor Bishop and he now is head of the
Physiology Department. See Scott Jaschik, Academic Freedom Could Be Limited by Court
Ruling, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., April 17, 1991, at Al (noting that Professor Bishop holds the
position of associate professor and director of University of Alabama's Human Perforniance
Laboratory).
217. Cf. Deposition of Rodney Roth, taken 1-5-89, p. 36, lines 12-16; p. 22, line 19 - p.
33, line 14 (stating that University of Alabama felt that it was inappropriate for professors to
make religious comments in classroom). In fact, Professor .Bishop's classroom comments
appear to be a much less egregious infringement of the Establishment Clause than the
Pennsylvania statute.providing for government aid to private schools that the Court upheld in
Lemon v. Kurtzman. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Lemon statute resulted in a proportion of the
state aid going directly to parochial schools. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 621.
218. See Deposition of Rodney Roth, taken 1-5-89, p. 37, lines 6-17 (stating that admin-
istration of University of Alabama considers it inappropriate for teachers to make religious
comments during instructional periods); see also Deposition of Carl Westerfield, taken 1-5-89,
p. 15, line 23 - p. 16, line 19 (stating that University of Alabama censored Professor Bishop
within one term after he held optional class). The fact that University administrators acted so
quickly in restricting Professor Bishop's "religious" comments indicates a hostility to the use
of any classroom time to discuss theories which involve religious connotations. Id. Both Mr.
Westerfield, Professor Bishop's immediate supervisor, and Mr. Roth, dean of the School of
Education, indicated that they felt that religious remarks had no place in a University of
Alabama classroom. Deposition of Carl Westerfield, taken 1-5-89, p. 15, lines 16-22; Deposition
of Rodney Roth, taken 1-5-89, p. 18, lines 2-22.
219. See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text (outlining criteria of Lemon test for
determining if government act violates Establishment Clause).
220. See Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (Q. White
and J. Rehnquist, concurring) (arguing that excessive entanglement prong is vague and
redundant to secular purpose prong).
221. Deposition of Phillip A. Bishop, taken 3-14-89, p. 95, line 8 - p. 96, line 10 (noting
that Professor Bishop's religious comments took up approximately five minutes out of 2,250
total instructional hours per class).
222. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272 n.1l (1981) (stating that University of
Missouri at Kansas City's regulation preventing Christian student group from using university
facilities for meetings creates greater risk that UMKC will become entangled with religion than
would general open forum policy).
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religious speech and personal bias appears to be even more expansive and
entangling than the regulation addressed by the Widmar Court.m Not only
does the University policy require the University to determine what is
religious and personal and what is not, but also it requires the University
to ferret out every statement made by its professors. 224 This effect of the
University of Alabama's regulation also may cause the regulation to fail
the second prong of the Lemon test because the policy inhibits religion.2
The University prohibition clearly indicates that the administration felt that
religious philosophies are without academic merit. 2 26 Thus, the regulation
appears to inhibit religion by characterizing it as unworthy of consideration
and banning any idea traditionally associated with religious doctrines from
the scrutiny of the collegiate marketplace of ideas. 227
CONCLUSION
Viewpoint discrimination is both inappropriate and unnecessary as a
mechanism for university control and regulation of its curriculum. "22 View-
point discrimination does not become any more palatable because it is used
in conjunction with the Establishment Clause. 229 There is no academic
discipline that scholars so thoroughly comprehend that it precludes the
usefulness of new or different ideas.230 Measures that restrict whole sources
of knowledge from the academic debate go against the very nature of the
university system and serve only to instill orthodoxy by limiting the spectrum
223. See infra notes 224-27 and accompanying text (arguing that University of Alabama's
speech restriction violates third prong of Lemon test).
224. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272 n.11 (1981) (noting that university
risks greater entanglement with religion by attempting to enforce its restriction barring use of
its facilities by religious groups because university will have to monitor group meetings to
ensure that no religious activities take place and it will have to define what is and is not
religious).
225. See infra notes 226-27 and accompanying text (arguing that University of Alabama's
speech restriction violates second prong of Lemon test because it undermines religion).
226. Cf. Deposition of Rodney Roth, taken 1-5-89, p. 54, line 2 - p. 56, line 17 (stating
that Professor Bishop's religious views are irrelevant to study of physiology); Deposition of
Carl Westerfield, taken 1-5-89, p. 35, lines 14-22 (stating that University deemed it inappropriate
for professors to make religious comments in classroom).
227. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 589 (1987) (noting that Louisiana Balanced
Treatment Act had effect of discrediting evolution science by mandating that teaching of
creation science whenever teachers include evolution in curriculum). It seems that the University
of Alabama's speech restriction, which completely excludes religious ideas from the classroom,
would have a much greater discrediting effect on religion than the Balanced Treatment Act
had on evolution science. Cf. id.
228. See infra notes 229-35 and accompanying text (arguing that courts ought to utilize
the Tinker material disruption of educational operation test in evaluating university speech
restrictions).
229. See infra notes 219-27 and accompanying text (arguing that University of Alabama's
speech restriction is more violative of Lemon test than Professor Bishop's classroom comments).
230. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
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of inquiry.? The worth of religious ideas ought to be tested in the crucible
of the academic environment rather than exempted from the debate by
speech codes or the Establishment Clause.2 2 If the Establishment Clause
means that anything that receives public funds must be devoid of religion,
then given the ever expanding role of the government in education, the
religious principles upon which our country was founded will be excluded
unfairly from the academic forum. This application of the Establishment
Clause is not religion-neutral, it is anti-religion.
A better standard for defining the relationship between academic and
institutional freedom is that which the Supreme Court articulated in Tin-
ker.233 Under the Tinker approach, a university only may enjoin free speech
that materially disrupts the classroom. Thus, a university may restrict speech
that interferes with its educational mission.2 4 In addition, a university can
utilize compensation and the tenure system to encourage teachers to accom-
plish their classroom responsibilities and engage in professional behavior.2
5
Thus, a university can effectively control the content of its curriculum
without chilling the academic freedom which has promoted diversity and
critical thinking in the college classroom.
JoHN W. HAMILTON
231. See id. (noting that university should be marketplace of ideas); see also Rabban,
supra note I, at (noting that academic freedom provides professors and students protection
from government orthodoxy).
232. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (noting that exposure to diverse ideas
enhances student's critical thinking skills).
233. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text (arguing that appropriate standard
for evaluating university restrictions of speech is that university can only restrict professors'
or students' speech when that speech materially disrupts educational process).
234. Id.
235. See supra note 115 (noting that university can ensure professional behavior of
professors through work evaluations, compensation and tenure).
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